Fix Unrestricted Resource Consumption in RedwoodJS
RedwoodJS applications, leveraging GraphQL and Prisma, are susceptible to Unrestricted Resource Consumption if the API surface doesn't enforce strict limits on query complexity and data retrieval. Attackers can exploit this by requesting deeply nested relations or massive datasets in a single call, leading to CPU exhaustion, memory leaks, and database connection pool saturation. To secure the stack, we must implement depth limiting and hard-cap pagination parameters.
The Vulnerable Pattern
// api/src/services/posts/posts.js // VULNERABILITY: No upper bound on 'take' allows an attacker to request millions of records. export const posts = ({ limit }) => { return db.post.findMany({ take: limit }) }
// api/src/graphql/posts.sdl.js type Post { id: Int! comments: [Comment!]! } type Comment { id: Int! post: Post! } // VULNERABILITY: Recursive schema allows infinite depth queries like posts { comments { post { comments { … } } } }
The Secure Implementation
The fix targets two primary vectors: Query Depth and Result Set Size. 1. By integrating the '@envelop/depth-limit' plugin into the Redwood GraphQL handler, we terminate queries that exceed a safe nesting threshold, neutralizing circular reference attacks. 2. In the service layer, we implement a 'Hard-Cap' pattern on Prisma's 'take' argument. Even if a user provides a limit of 1,000,000, the application logic constrains it to a safe maximum (e.g., 100), ensuring the Node.js heap and the database remain stable under load.
// api/src/functions/graphql.js import { createGraphQLHandler } from '@redwoodjs/graphql-server' import { depthLimitPlugin } from '@envelop/depth-limit'export const handler = createGraphQLHandler({ // Enforce a maximum query depth of 5 to prevent recursive DOS extraPlugins: [depthLimitPlugin({ maxDepth: 5 })], /* … */ })
// api/src/services/posts/posts.js export const posts = ({ limit = 20 }) => { const MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 100 // Hard-cap the ‘take’ parameter to prevent massive DB sweeps const take = Math.min(limit, MAX_PAGE_SIZE) return db.post.findMany({ take }) }
Your RedwoodJS API
might be exposed to Unrestricted Resource Consumption
74% of RedwoodJS apps fail this check. Hackers use automated scanners to find this specific flaw. Check your codebase before they do.
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