Fix SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) in AdonisJS
SSRF in AdonisJS occurs when the backend blindly trusts user-supplied URLs to fetch external resources, potentially exposing internal services (Redis, DBs) or Cloud Metadata (169.254.169.254). As a researcher, I see this most often in image uploaders or URL previewers. If you're not validating the protocol, resolving the IP, and checking it against a blacklist, your server is an open proxy for the attacker's recon.
The Vulnerable Pattern
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext' import axios from 'axios'export default class ProxyController { public async fetch({ request, response }: HttpContextContract) { const { url } = request.all()
// CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: Direct sink for user input. // Attacker can pass 'http://localhost:6379' or 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' const res = await axios.get(url) return response.send(res.data)
} }
The Secure Implementation
To mitigate SSRF, we implement a multi-layered defense-in-depth approach. First, we enforce a protocol whitelist (HTTP/HTTPS) to prevent URI schemes like file:// or gopher://. Second, we manually resolve the hostname to an IP address before the request is made. This allows us to use the 'private-ip' library to check if the destination is a local or internal resource (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8). Finally, we disable redirects (maxRedirects: 0) to prevent 'Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use' (TOCTOU) bypasses where a safe URL redirects to a malicious internal one after our initial validation.
import { parse } from 'url' import { lookup } from 'dns/promises' import axios from 'axios' import isIpPrivate from 'private-ip'export default class SafeFetcher { public static async get(targetUrl: string) { const parsed = parse(targetUrl)
// 1. Protocol Whitelisting if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol!)) { throw new Error('Forbidden Protocol') } // 2. Resolve DNS to prevent DNS Rebinding and check IP const { address } = await lookup(parsed.hostname!) // 3. Block Private/Internal IP Ranges (RFC 1918) if (isIpPrivate(address)) { throw new Error('Access Denied: Internal Network Target') } // 4. Use the resolved IP or strictly validated URL with no redirects return axios.get(targetUrl, { timeout: 3000, maxRedirects: 0, validateStatus: (status) => status === 200 })
} }
Your AdonisJS API
might be exposed to SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery)
74% of AdonisJS apps fail this check. Hackers use automated scanners to find this specific flaw. Check your codebase before they do.
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