SQLi in Masonite frameworks stems from bypassing the Orator ORM or the DB manager to execute raw, unparameterized queries. If you're using f-strings or string concatenation inside DB calls, you've opened a backdoor. This guide covers nuking these vulnerabilities using the Query Builder and proper parameter binding.

The Vulnerable Pattern

from masonite.facades import DB
VULNERABLE: Direct string interpolation into raw SQL
user_id = request.input(‘id’)
user = DB.statement(f”SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ‘{user_id}’“)
VULNERABLE: Using raw() without bindings
results = DB.table(‘users’).where_raw(f”email = ‘{request.input(‘email’)}’“).get()

The Secure Implementation

The vulnerability occurs because the database engine interprets user-supplied strings as part of the SQL command logic. By switching to the Masonite Query Builder (DB.table), the framework utilizes prepared statements under the hood. For cases where raw SQL is unavoidable, the '?' placeholder combined with a secondary list of values ensures the database driver treats the input strictly as data, not executable code, effectively neutralizing injection payloads like "' OR '1'='1".

from masonite.facades import DB
SECURE: Using the Query Builder (Auto-parameterization)
user_id = request.input(‘id’)
user = DB.table(‘users’).where(‘id’, user_id).first()
SECURE: Raw statement with positional parameter binding
user = DB.statement(“SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?”, [user_id])
SECURE: where_raw with bindings
email = request.input(‘email’)
results = DB.table(‘users’).where_raw(“email = ?”, [email]).get()