Fix NoSQL Injection in Nitro
Nitro/h3 applications are often backed by NoSQL databases like MongoDB. The primary attack vector is Object Injection via `getQuery` or `readBody`. If an attacker sends a payload like `?id[$gt]=`, Nitro parses this as a nested object. Passing this directly to a database driver allows an attacker to bypass authentication or dump data using operators like `$ne`, `$gt`, or `$regex`.
The Vulnerable Pattern
export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
const query = getQuery(event);
// VULNERABLE: If query.username is { "$ne": null }, it bypasses logic
const user = await db.collection('users').findOne({ username: query.username });
return user;
});
The Secure Implementation
The fix involves strict input validation and type enforcement. By using `getValidatedQuery` (or `getValidatedBody`) with a schema validator like Zod, you ensure that the input is a primitive string rather than a potentially malicious object. If an attacker attempts to pass an object where a string is expected, the validator will throw an error, preventing the NoSQL operator from ever reaching the database driver. Always treat `getQuery` as an untrusted object factory.
import { z } from 'zod';export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => { // SECURE: Use getValidatedQuery to enforce string types and strip objects const schema = z.object({ username: z.string().min(1) });
const { username } = await getValidatedQuery(event, schema.parse);
const user = await db.collection(‘users’).findOne({ username }); return user; });
Your Nitro API
might be exposed to NoSQL Injection
74% of Nitro apps fail this check. Hackers use automated scanners to find this specific flaw. Check your codebase before they do.
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